Abstract. Conventional models of equilibrium unemployment typically imply that proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment as long as the tax does not affect the replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance, i.e. unemployment benefits relative to after-tax earnings. When home production is an option, the conventional results may no longer hold. This paper uses a search equilibrium model with home production to examine the employment and welfare implications of labor taxes. The employment effect of a rise in a proportional tax is found to be negative for sufficiently low replacement rates, whereas it is ambiguous for moderate and high replacement rates. Numerical calibrations of the model indicate that employment generally falls when labor taxes are raised.
INTRODUCTION
A popular theme in current policy discussions about labor market reform is that high taxes on labor contribute to high unemployment. Although the claim appears intuitively plausible, it has not received overwhelming support from theoretical and empirical research on unemployment and wage determination. In fact, proportional taxes on labor earnings are neutral with respect to unemployment in many conventional models and the empirical research has shown mixed results. 1 Most of the theoretical models identify the`benefit regime' as the crucial factor that determines how labor taxes affect labor costs and ultimately unemployment. Taxes are neutral as long as they do not affect the after-tax replacement rate, i.e. the relationship between income when unemployed and 1.
The large empirical literature involves numerous studies of the relationships between labor costs and labor taxes. Tyrva Èinen (1995), Gruber (1997) , Jackman et al. (1996) , and Nymoen and Rùdseth (1999) are examples with somewhat conflicting results. Other studies have investigated whether taxes help explain the evolution of unemployment over time and differences across countries; see for example Layard et al. (1991) , Nickell and Layard (1999) , Elmeskov et al. (1998) , Phelps (1994) , and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) .
income when employed. There is in general complete real wage flexibility with respect to changes in labor taxes if unemployment compensation is indexed to the real after-tax consumption wage through a fixed replacement rate. Labor taxes are then borne by labor and there is no effect on labor costs and unemployment.
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The potential for employment gains through lower labor taxes hinges on the impact on the replacement rate; there will be an increase in employment only if the tax cut reduces the replacement rate. A benefit regime involving unemployment compensation fixed in real terms has this feature. A tax cut induces an increase in the real wage, which implies a decline in the relative compensation of unemployed workers. The tax cut works because it effectively reduces the replacement rate. 3 The existing literature on taxes and unemployment has paid little attention to income sources other than labor earnings and unemployment benefits. 4 A shortcut is to allow for exogenous income or utility components, such as income from the`informal sector', income from home production or a fixed value of leisure; see, for example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) and Mortensen (1994) . Tax cuts will bring about a fall in unemployment provided that (i) the additional income sources are unresponsive to changes in the real wage, and (ii) more prevalent among unemployed than among employed workers. The reason for this result is, again, that the tax cut reduces the effective replacement rate by inducing a proportionally bigger increase in labor income than in total unemployment compensation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of labor taxes on labor market outcomes in a model of equilibrium unemployment where the worker's income from home production is endogenously determined. To this end a search equilibrium framework along the lines of Pissarides (1990) is extended to allow for home production.
5 Time devoted to home production is taken to be a choice variable for unemployed individuals who allocate their time between job search and home production. The effective replacement rate ± inclusive of income from home production ± is endogenous in this environment, irrespective of whether unemployment benefits are indexed to labor earnings or fixed in real terms.
For simplicity, we focus on a one-sector economy where the good produced in the household is a perfect substitute to the market-produced good. By contrast, the existing literature on taxation and household production has been primarily concerned with the case for tax differentiation, where the differentiation may depend on the degree of substitutability between market and non-market goods. The contributions in this field include papers by Sandmo (1990) , Fredriksen et al. (1995) , Sùrensen (1997) , Kolm (2000) , and Kleven et al. (2000) . Sandmo and Kleven et al. consider economies with competitive labor markets, whereas the other three papers allow for unemployment due to real wage rigidities.
Models of home production are in some sense observationally equivalent to models with endogenous leisure. Indeed,`for any model with home production, there is a model without home production, but with different preferences, that generate the same outcome for market quantities ' (Benhabib et al., 1991 ' (Benhabib et al., , p. 1170 . The motivation for introducing home production in the present analysis is the desire to build a simple general equilibrium model that encompasses two empirically relevant predictions: (i) hours of work are decreasing in the labor tax rate, and (ii) equilibrium unemployment is independent of the level of productivity. The second of those predictions can also be generated by a model with endogenous leisure, provided that the utility function is of the Cobb±Douglas variety; see for example Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) . The Cobb±Douglas representation of preferences is restrictive for the purposes of this paper, however, as it implies that hours worked do not respond to proportional taxes.
The next section of the paper presents the basic model and Section 3 examines the effects of changes in labor taxes. The main analytical result is that a rise in a proportional tax reduces equilibrium employment as long as the replacement rate is sufficiently low.
THE MODEL

The labor market
The number of individuals in the economy is fixed and normalized to unity. The individuals are either employed or unemployed, the time horizon is infinite and time is continuous. Employed workers are separated from their jobs at the exogenous rate 0. Unemployed workers find new jobs at a rate that depends on their search effort, s, as well as general labor market conditions. If u denotes the number of unemployed workers we can take su to represent the effective number of job searchers in the economy.
The matching process is given by a standard concave and constant-returnsto-scale function that relates the flow of hires, H, to the number of vacancies, v, and the effective number of job searchers, su, i.e. HvY su. The rate at which the unemployed worker finds a new job is given by sHvY suasu s, where ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 vasu is a measure of labor market tightness and HvY suasu HY 1. The rate at which firms fill vacancies is given as q HvY suav H1Y 1a. Hence, q, where H b 0 and q H `0; the tighter the labor market, the easier for workers to find jobs and the more difficult for firms to find workers. Moreover, note that the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to tightness falls in the unit interval, an implication of constant returns to matching; we have Àq H aq, where P 0Y 1. The flow equilibrium for the economy can be written as an unemployment equation of the form:
Worker behavior
Individuals are risk neutral, face an exogenous interest rate, r, and derive utility from consumption of the single good in the economy. The good is either purchased from the market or produced at home. The employed worker's time, normalized to unity, is allocated to market work, l, and home production, h e , i.e. 1 l h e . The unemployed worker allocates time to search, s, and home production, h u , i.e. 1 s h u . The home production function, z j zh j , j eY u, is increasing and strictly concave.
The employed worker's instantaneous income is given as I e wl zh e R, where w is the real hourly wage and R is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The unemployed individual's income derives from home production, the transfer and unemployment benefits (Z b , i.e. I u zh u R Z b . Let U and E denote the expected present values of being unemployed and employed, respectively. The value functions for worker i can be written as follows:
In a symmetric equilibrium, the utility difference between the expected present values is independent of the transfer and given as:
The employed worker's time allocation is determined through bargaining between the worker and the firm. The unemployed worker chooses search intensity, s i , to maximize rU i . The first-order condition for an interior solution takes the form:
where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing search, which is forgone home production. The right-hand side is the expected marginal return from an increase in search effort. By making use of (4) and (5) we obtain the partial equilibrium results that an increase in the market wage as well as an increase in labor market tightness reduces the unemployed worker's time in home production (and thus increases search): dh u i adw`0 and dh u i ad`0. These results are implied by the concavity of the production function and the fact that E À U is increasing in the wage as well as in tightness. Note that the right-hand side of (5) is invariant to derivative changes in search effort (time spent in home production), by the envelope theorem. A rise in the wage increases the utility surplus from employment, which encourages search (discourages home production). A rise in tightness increases the marginal return from search, which has similar effects. Also notice that E À U is decreasing in the benefit level, which in turn discourages search effort; hence dh 
Firm behavior
The model of the firm follows Pissarides (1990) with explicit allowance made for hours of work. Let V be the value of an unfilled job and J denote the value of a filled job. The value functions are:
Labor productivity ± output per hour ± is constant and denoted y. The cost of holding a vacancy is ky, with k b 0.
6 The proportional payroll tax rate is denoted t. Invoking the standard free entry condition for vacancies, V 0, we obtain:
which implies a relationship between the`feasible' real wage and labor market tightness, conditional on hours of work and the tax rate:
A rise in working time increases the feasible real wage. One can think of this relationship as capturing a productivity effect of longer work-hours. Suppose 6.
Appendix A provides a rationalization for this specification of vacancy costs.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 that the firm has a production department and a personnel department. A rise in work-hours allows the firm to transfer some workers from recruitment activities to production while keeping its total workforce constant. The higher output per employed worker implies a higher feasible real wage.
Bargaining over hours and wages
Wages and work-hours are determined in decentralized Nash bargains between the individual worker and the firm. The Nash bargain thus solves:
where P 0Y 1. The first-order conditions with respect to the wage and the work-hours are obtained as:
where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry condition V 0, which implies J kyaq. These equations imply:
which states that the employed worker's marginal product in home production equals the tax-adjusted marginal product in market work. The allocation of time for the employed worker is thus independent of labor market tightness; we have l lt and h e 1 À lt with l H t`0. The feasible real wage can then be written as a function of and t: w y 1 À r 0k qlt 1 1 t 13 which we write as w y)Y t, where ) `0 and ) t`0 . It is convenient to combine the expression for the worker's utility surplus, E À U, as given by (4), with the feasible real wage in (13) and recognizing h e h e t. We refer to this expression as the`feasible utility surplus', denoted by FÁ:
where I e y)Y tlt z e h e t R, I u z u h u Z b R, and F `0 . Note that the right-hand side of (14) is invariant to derivative changes of s and h u , by the envelope theorem. Analogously, we refer to the first-order condition for the bargained wage in (10) as the`bargained surplus':
where B b 0.
Equilibrium
We can characterize the equilibrium of the model by making use of two relationships, namely the feasible surplus, FY t, and the bargained surplus, BY t, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Since F `0 and B b 0, the equilibrium is unique and labor market tightness is given as the solution to the equation
Many of the comparative statics properties of the model are conventional, at least as far as the effects on tightness are concerned. The effect on tightness follows by implicit differentiation of (15), noting that É `0 ; the sign of the effect of, say, a rise in the interest rate is thus given by the sign of É r . It is clear that labor market tightness falls as a response to: (i) a rise in the worker's bargaining power, ; (ii) a rise in the cost of holding a vacancy, k; (iii) a rise in the discount rate, r; (iv) a rise in the separation rate, 0; and (v) a rise in the benefit level, Z b . The response to changes in labor productivity is somewhat less obvious. We wish to have a model with the realistic property that labor market tightness and unemployment are independent of the level of productivity. Two additional assumptions are introduced to achieve this: (i) Unemployment benefits are indexed to labor earnings through a fixed replacement rate, i.e. Z b &wl, & P 0Y 1.
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(ii) The home production functions are given as z j yf h j for j eY u. In words: productivity in home production rises along with productivity in market production.
With these assumptions we can state the following result: 8 Lemma 1. A uniform increase in labor productivity, i.e. an increase in y, is neutral with respect to labor market tightness, hours of work in the market and in the household, search effort, and unemployment: dady dh e ady dlady dh u ady dsady duady 0.
To prove Lemma 1, note that assumption (ii) together with equation (12) implies that time allocation for the employed worker is independent of productivity. The feasible real wage implies a relationship of the form w y 1 À r 0kaqlt 1 t À1 . Substituting into (15) while recognizing that z j yf h j and Z b &w Á l Á yield an expression from which y can be eliminated. is thus independent of y. Also, using (1), it is clear that unemployment is independent of the level of productivity.
THE EFFECTS OF TAXES
We proceed to investigate the effects of proportional labor taxes, assuming that tax revenues are spent as uniform lump-sum grants to each individual in the economy. The utility difference between employed and unemployed workers is thus not affected by the amount of tax revenues raised. The revenue side of the tax system is hence neutral with respect to the real outcomes in the economy and we can examine the effects of varying the tax rates without having to consider how the tax revenues are used. The government's budget restriction, given as t1 À uwl R u&wl, is always fulfilled through adjustment of the lump-sum grant.
7.
Note that & is equivalent to the after-tax replacement rate from the worker's perspective since all taxes are levied on firms. 8.
F `0 still holds since & P 0Y 1. Hence É `0 .
Comparative statics
It is clear from (15), recognizing Z b &wl, that the tax rate affects tightness through several routes. First, the tax rate affects the employed worker's utility, given tightness, as given by:
where the first term is negative and the second positive (since z H h e ya1 t b w). The expression simplifies to dI e Áadt Àwla1 t`0 if (12) and (13) are invoked. The FÁ-schedule is shifted to the left and tightness tends to fall. A second effect operates through the benefit level when benefits are indexed to earnings. The higher the tax rate, the lower the benefit level and the higher the feasible utility surplus to the worker. The third effect enters through the bargained surplus. A higher marginal tax reduces the gain to the firm of raising the wage, thus inducing wage moderation and a fall in E À U, given tightness. The BÁ-schedule shifts to the right and tightness thus tends to rise.
To determine the net effect on tightness it is useful to begin with a special case where the replacement rate is zero, in which case the induced effect on tightness does not appear. Implicit differentiation of (15) yields:
To sign dadt we thus need to determine the sign of the term z e À z u . In other words, how does time in home production differ between employed and unemployed workers? We can state the following results:
Lemma 2. The allocation of time in equilibrium involves h e`hu and hence l b s and z e`zu for production functions of the form z j yf h j .
Note that the equality h e h u would require equality between the employed worker's marginal product in home production and the marginal return to search, i.e. ya1 t E À U . However, it can be shown that the inequality ya1 t b E À U holds, implying that unemployed workers spend more time in home production than those who are employed. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 2 in conjunction with (17) thus imply dadt`0; a tax increase reduces labor market tightness. To obtain the effect on unemployment we need to consider how search effort is affected. Use the first-order condition for optimal search in (5) together with the Nash rule in (10) to obtain:
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The right-hand side of (18) is the equilibrium marginal return to search, or the shadow wage of home production for an unemployed worker. The shadow wage is increasing in labor market tightness. A tax hike thus increases home production ± reduces search ± both directly and indirectly through t. The effect on unemployment is obtained by differentiation of equation (1), recognizing t and s stY t. The result is duadt b 0. It is also straightforward to show that a tax increase produces an unambiguous decline in the real wage. Use w y)tY t and differentiate to obtain dwadt`0.
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The results for the special case with & 0 is summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 1. A tax increase has the following effects on labor market tightness, real wages, home production, work-hours, search, and unemployment: dadt`0, dwadt`0, dh e adt b 0, dh u adt b 0Y dladt`0, dsadt`0, and duadt b 0.
Turning now to the general case with & b 0, it is clear that tax changes induce changes in the benefit level, which in turn influence the overall effects of taxes. The derivative of interest is:
where $ l t Àdlnladln1 t b 0 is the elasticity of hours of work with respect to the payroll tax rate, as implied by (12). The inequality z e`zu is no longer sufficient to guarantee a negative sign since the third term in (19) is positive. The more sensitive hours are with respect to the tax rate, and the higher the replacement rate, the more likely the possibility that this`benefit effect' dominates. In general, the effect on tightness is ambiguous.
Calibration
We proceed to a numerical calibration of the model. The matching function is taken to be Cobb±Douglas, i.e. H msu v 1À , where Àq H aq . We also assume that the worker's share of the total match surplus equals the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment, i.e. ; this is the socalled Hosios condition that implies that the search equilibrium outcome is efficient under certain conditions (Hosios, 1990) . We set 0X5.
The home production functions are of the form:
See the Working Paper version of the paper available at the GESifo website: www.CESifo.de. That paper also briefly examines progressive taxes.
for j eY u and b`1. The unemployed worker's time in home production is obtained by invoking equation (19) . The day is taken as time unit, y is normalized to 100 and the separation and interest rates are set to 0 0X25a365 and r 0X10a365. The parameters k, a, b, and m were chosen so as to obtaiǹ reasonable' values of $ l t and 5 percent unemployment for a base run with t 0X25. We set & 0X30, which is an average replacement rate for OECD countries (see Elmeskov et al., 1998) . The implied elasticity of hours with respect to tax rates appear reasonable in light of the empirical studies on labor supply. We have $ l t P 0X24Y 0X43 as we proceed from t 0X25 to t 0X55. It should be recognized, however, that conventional labor supply studies presumes that working time is at the worker's discretion. 10 The implied partial equilbrium (-constant) elasticity of the exit rate from unemployment with respect to benefits, evaluated at the equilibrium with t 0X25, is in a region where the empirical estimates typically fall: we have dlnsadln& % À0X6.
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We also report the effects on the tax revenues, T t1 À uwl, the effective replacement rate, I
u aI e , and the steady-state output, inclusive of home production but net of vacancy costs:
A measure of the marginal social cost of raising taxes ± or marginal excess burden ± is given by ÁQaÁT, the change in total output per dollar of additional tax revenues. Table 1 shows the results of the calibrations. Tax increases produce modest increases in unemployment at low initial tax rates and substantial effects at high rates. A comparison with the estimates reported in the recent study by Elmeskov et al. (1998) is useful. This study, based on pooled data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1983±95, suggests that a rise in the overall tax rate by 10 percentage points would raise the unemployment rate by slightly more than 1 percentage point. These results are broadly in line with the simulation results for intermediate tax rates in Table 1 .
The effective replacement rate increases from 55 to 79 percent as tax rates are increased from 25 to 55 percent. There are no Laffer effects, i.e. higher tax rates do produce higher tax revenues. The marginal excess burden is modest for low tax rates but substantial for high rates. We have ÁQaÁT À0X16 for tax increases from 25 to 35 percent and ÁQaÁT À1X16 for increases from 45 to 55 percent.
10.
The recent survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) reports estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply centered around 0.1 for males and around 0.7 for females. 11. Layard et al. (1991) summarize the empirical work by the claim that`the basic result is that the elasticity of the expected duration of unemployment with respect to benefits is generally in the range 0.2±0.9 depending on the state of the labor market and the country concerned . . . ' (p. 255) . 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper has explored some effects of proportional labor taxes in a search equilibrium model of the labor market. An attractive feature of this model is that it conveniently allows for an arguably realistic analysis of the unemployed worker's time allocation problem in an environment where both search and home production are options. Moreover, we can analyze how taxes affect unemployment and hours worked in a unified theoretical framework. The results confirm that some well-known neutrality results in the existing literature disappear once we allow for endogenous home production. Higher proportional labor taxes cause higher unemployment for zero or sufficiently low replacement rates in unemployment insurance. The effect on unemployment is ambiguous in general, but the numerical calibrations suggest that tax hikes contribute to higher unemployment.
A natural extension of the analysis would be to develop a model with two market sectors, where one sector produces goods that are close or perfect substitutes to the goods produced at home. Such a model would allow an analysis of the employment and welfare implications of sectoral tax differentiation in a unified general equilibrium framework. It could also be used for comparisons between alternative tax reforms, for example comparisons between the effects of general tax cuts and sectorally differentiated tax cuts. These and other issues are left for future work.
APPENDIX A. ON VACANCY COSTS
The purpose of this note is to derive an equation for the feasible real wage from a model of a`large' firm and show that the chosen specification of vacancy costs ± with costs proportional to labor productivity as given by equation (6) ± is consistent with a specific recruitment technology. Consider a firm that allocates its labor force between production and recruitment activities. Let n i denote the total number of employees and e i the number of workers allocated to the production department. Vacancies (v i ) are created according to the`production function' v i cn i À e i l i (A.1)
where l i denotes work-hours and c is a positive parameter. The net change in employment is given by n i qv i À 0n i q cn i À e i l i À 0n i (A.2)
where 0 is the separation rate. In a steady state, the ratio e i an i is given as
The ratio is increasing in the number of work-hours. A rise in work-hours means that more workers can be recruited by a given number of workers in the personnel department. The firm can thus transfer some workers to the production department without experiencing a decline in its total workforce. This implies a rise in labor productivity, which in turn increases the feasible real wage, i.e. the wage that the firm can offer its workers at zero profits.
Let the firm's profits be given by This is an equation of the same form as equation (9) in the main text, with r 0 and k 1ac.
A dynamic formulation yields the same expression, except for an interest factor. Suppose that the firm's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of profits, i.e. The firm's problem is to maximize Å i subject to (A.2). By standard methods one can establish that the necessary conditions for maximum can be collapsed to:
which is equivalent to the labor demand condition given by (9) in the main text.
